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The influence of the cognitive revolution on literacy research and practice over the past quarter of a century has been both profound and pervasive. This influence is, perhaps, seen most readily in relation to the development of schema theory and the role it has played in exploring and conceptualizing reading and writing (e.g., Anderson & Pearson, 1984; Tierney & Shanahan, 1991) . Recently, however, we have witnessed the growing influence of various social conceptions of mind with their corresponding implications for understanding literacy processes. These have included Vygotsky's sociocultural theory (e.g., Cole, 1996; Gavelek & Raphael, 1996; Moll, 1990; Wertsch, 1991 Wertsch, , 1998 , various renderings of social constructivism (Au, 1998; Greene & Ackerman, 1995; Spivey, 1997) , and discursive psychology (Gergen & Gergen, 1983; Harré & Gillett, 1994) . Central to this recognition of the social is the important role of discourse processes in the development of mind and literacy (e.g., Gee, 1997a Gee, , 2000 Santa Barbara Discourse Group, 1994) . As is often the case in pendulum sweeps that characterize educational inquiry, there is a danger of overcorrection. Either the social comes to be emphasized to the relative exclusion of the individual, or vice versa.
With this in mind, we examine recent contributions of social and cultural perspectives and how these might contribute to and change our current conceptions of schema theory. With its emphasis on individual, cognitive processes, schema theory and research conducted through that lens have helped researchers and teachers to understand how knowledge is organized and has helped shed light on the individual cognitive routines that children employ during the reading process. We examine schema theory because of its resilience in the field and because of its utility in helping teachers and researchers understand the role of an individual's prior knowledge in comprehension. Whereas schema theory foregrounds the role of individual cognitive processes, sociocultural theories, particularly the work of Vygotsky (1978 Vygotsky ( , 1986 and scholars who use Vygotsky's work (e.g., Au, 1998; Cole, 1996; Gavelek & Raphael, 1996; Gee, 1992; Holland & Cole, 1995; Kozulin, Gindis, Ageyev, & Miller, 2003; Moll, 1990; Rogoff, 1993; Wells, 1999) have also provided significant insights into individuals' meaning-making processes by highlighting the role of language as mediational tool, the importance of social interactions, and the situatedness of language and social interactions within cultural and historical systems. We examine sociocultural perspectives because of their continuing influence and importance in the field and their ability to contribute to our understanding of the interplay between literate processes and the social and cultural lives of children as they carry out meaning-making activities. In undertaking such exploration, we seek to blur the boundaries that have traditionally separated schema theoretic perspectives and research from sociocultural perspectives and research, with the aim of rethinking the construct of schema.
As teachers and teacher educators, we believe that schema theory has been a powerful tool in helping us and in helping pre-service and in-service teachers understand reading comprehension. But the growing influence of sociocultural perspectives has also led to an additional tension. We have noted that researchers and authors of literacy and language arts textbooks continue to talk about schema theory as a useful model of reading comprehension, as distinct from current sociocultural lines of inquiry into literacy development and practice, because such inquiries emerged from different views of knowledge and knowledge construction. Although discussions of schema theory inevitably raise discussions of cultural knowledge, little work has been undertaken to bridge the gap between versions of schema as an in-the-head phenomenon and more recent sociocultural perspectives that treat schema as something that exists beyond the individual and within an individual's social and cultural communities. For example, how might we rethink schema in light of perspectives that argue that mind "extends beyond the skin" (Wertsch, 1991, p. 14) , in that mind is discursively produced (e.g., Harré & Gillett, 1994; Harré & Stearns, 1995) and socially distributed (Gee, 1992 (Gee, , 1997b Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff & Lave, 1984) ? In particular, what might we learn from sociocultural perspectives about the origins and development of schemas?
To begin exploring such questions, we first briefly consider why it is important at this juncture to revisit schema theory. Second, we identify what we believe are the salient features of schema theory, and we trace the origins of schema as a construct and as related to research in the literacy field. We argue that schema theorists have inadequately explored the issue of schema origination. The genetic question focusing on the origins and development of knowledge is a fundamental question essential to sociocultural examinations of learning (Wertsch, 1991) , and a question that must be considered in reconciling social and individual perspectives. Third, we examine sociocultural perspectives to consider what they can contribute to our understandings of schema. By "sociocultural" we refer to the belief that thought has its genesis in social interaction (Vygotsky, 1978 (Vygotsky, , 1986 . Both externally focused, interpsychological tools, such as language and other sign systems, and internally focused, intrapsychological tools, such as thought, are created, shaped, and sustained in social and cultural contexts. Thus cognition does not exist as an isolated process within the individual but as a "bio-social-cultural process" that is both public and private (Cole, 1996, p. 136) . Sociocultural perspectives explore the role of ideal and material tools and activities, noting that both are ensconced in cultural systems and thus are devoid of meaning outside particular contexts and activities. We believe that by more explicitly linking the construct of schema with explorations of ideal and material tools and activity, we can enrich our understandings of schema theory. We posit that such a linkage may also have the added benefit of enriching our understandings of sociocultural perspectives. To illustrate the ways that schema theory has helped us understand comprehension and learning, and to illustrate some of our concerns about schema theory as traditionally conceived, we provide an example of classroom practice. Throughout this article, we advance the notion of schemas 1 as transactional and embodied constructs to address the subject-object dualism that underlies traditional cognitive science approaches.
Why Revisit Schema Theory?

Building on What We Have Learned
Recently, there have been calls to accept what we have learned about literacy practices and instruction and to acknowledge how our past knowledge helps to inform our present endeavors. Raphael (2001) reminded literacy educators and researchers that there is a collective body of knowledge that has been identified and developed related to literacy practices. In identifying various phases of literacy research, Raphael urged literacy scholars to look across these practices and acknowledge the impressive body of knowledge and areas of consensus that exist in the field, in order to avoid a mistake that has often been made in educational research. She argued that, "instead of recognizing that with each passing decade, our field has learned more about how to teach literacy, about the complexity of the literacy processes, and about the ways in which literacy is instantiated and valued across time and cultures; we [have] essentially [fallen] into the trap of assuming that new knowledge somehow replaced or overshadowed previous practice" (Raphael, 2001, p. 9) .
Others have also attempted to move the field toward consensus by pointing out some commonly accepted beliefs about literacy and literacy instruction (e.g., DudleyMarling & Murphy, 1998; Pearson, 1996) . Most of those who have identified an area for consensus have done so in relation to instructional practice. However, it is also important to revisit the particular theories and theoretical constructs on which such practices are predicated. Obviously, there are substantively different issues to draw upon when we foreground theory. The epistemological views tied to theory, for example, may not allow for consensus or agreement in the same manner as when we discuss methods of literacy learning and practice. Yet we believe there are some areas that are complementary but which are often seen as disparate and incommensurable, as was recently noted by Purcell-Gates, Jacobson, and Degener (2004) in their review of social and cognitive theories of literacy development. In addition, although scholars, notably Smagorinsky (2001) , have begun articulating cultural theories of reading, we believe that additional explorations are needed.
As we were preparing this article, some of our colleagues asked us why we felt it was important to revisit schema theory. Some skeptics cite numerous studies couched in sociocultural perspectives and numerous reviews of research that seem to establish sociocultural perspectives as "the winner" in the clash of cognitive versus social paradigms. A review of the third volume of the Handbook of Reading Research (Kamil, Mosenthal, Pearson, & Barr, 2000) bears out the importance of social and cultural perspectives and their role in reading research (see, for example, Bean, 2000; Florio-Ruane & McVee, 2000; Gaffney & Anderson, 2000; Gee, 2000) . Despite the fact that sociocultural perspectives have become increasingly prominent in conceptualizing educational research and practice (Hruby, 2001) , we also believe that the concept of schema is a useful and powerful tool for understanding reading processes.
Schema as a Construct for Understanding Reading Processes
The extent to which the literacy field still relies on and values schema theory can be seen from the results of an analysis of current reading and language arts texts for pre-service and in-service teachers. In a review of 25 reading/language arts texts published between 1989 and 2004, we found that all of the texts introduced schema theory to help explain the reading process, especially comprehension. The widespread reliance on schema theory indicates that educators still believe schema theory is a valuable tool in helping pre-service and in-service teachers understand cognitive and individual aspects of reading. At the same time, most of these same reading and language arts texts introduce their readers to sociocultural theories, particularly the work of Vygotsky. Despite the heavy reliance overall on social perspectives, none of the texts that we reviewed foregrounded social and cultural factors in their discussion of schema. A few noted that schema theory implies a network of social and cultural relationships but did not develop that idea with reference to social theories of reading and language use (e.g., Graves, Juel, & Graves, 2004) . Only two of the texts (Lipson & Wixson, 1997 Weaver, 1994 Weaver, /2002 sought to explicitly conjoin the discussion of cognitive perspectives with social perspectives on learning.
It is possible that this compartmentalization exists, in part, because textbooks are created to present information in an efficient and fairly straightforward manner; or the compartmentalization may be due to the lag that often exists when theory and research are translated into practice. That schema theory is still widely cited in reading and language arts texts is more intriguing when we consider that in a review of articles on research and practice, Gaffney and Anderson (2000) found that the terms "schema" or "schema theory" have fallen into disuse in describing research and practice in published journals. Although the terms "schema" or "schemata" appeared frequently in research and practitioner journals in the 1980s, researchers in recent years have opted to use terms such as existing knowledge, topic knowledge, prior knowledge, and previous knowledge. Gaffney and Anderson took this shift in terms as an indication that schema theory is used in general ways, and they expressed surprise at the limited references to schema theory in research, given the impact of schema theory on reading research in the early to middle 1980s. Others have observed that using terms such as background knowledge or prior knowledge interchangeably with schema implies a consensus that does not exist (Sadoski, Paivio, & Goetz, 1991) . This concern aside, the continued reliance on schema theory in textbooks as a means of describing cognitive reading processes to pre-service and in-service teachers supports Gaffney and Anderson's assertion that schema theory is still influencing our perceptions of reading and is believed to be a viable and valuable explanation for teachers. The point here is that the construct of schema is more than just a useful metaphor. The metaphor itself says something about how literacy researchers and educators have come to see reading processes, because "structural metaphors guide our thinking (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and, when incorporated into our models of cognition, stake out the parameters of our epistemologies" (Hruby, 2001, p. 48) .
At the same time, the dearth of articles that directly explore similarities between schema and sociocultural perspectives leads us to believe that literacy researchers and educators have not yet thought through the relationship between schema theory and more recently adopted sociocultural perspectives. Although we conjecture that many of our colleagues in literacy will agree that schema theoretic perspectives and sociocultural perspectives are not as dichotomous as once believed (see Frawley, 1997) , we know of no published work to date that explores whether and how schema theoretic perspectives may be reconciled with the social perspectives of mind and literacy espoused by sociocultural researchers.
Historical Review of Schema Theories
Early Use of "Schema": The Work of Kant, Bartlett, and Piaget The concept of the schema can be traced to Plato and Aristotle (Marshall, 1995) , but Kant (1929) is generally considered to be the first to talk about schemas as organizing structures that mediate how we see and interpret the world (Johnson, 1987) . Schemas are "a sort of bias inherent in the mind" (Campbell, 1989, p. 90) . For Kant a schema stood between or mediated the external world and internal mental structures; a schema was a lens that both shaped and was shaped by experience. Bartlett (1932 Bartlett ( /1995 used the term schema and conducted experiments to explore schemas as cultural constructs in memory, and this is the work most widely cited by schema theorists working in the cognitive era (Saito, 1996 ). Bartlett's research and writing point to schemas as more than in-the-head phenomena and provide a basis for thinking of them as patterns that extend beyond the knower into the social and cultural world (Saito, 1996 (Saito, , 2000 . In looking at Bartlett's work, it becomes clear that schema theory, at its inception, was not about in-the-head phenomena only. Middleton and Crook (1996) wrote of Bartlett (citing a 1961 republication of the same 1932/1995 book that we reference):
Bartlett discussed schema as an "organized setting" and not as some uniform feature of the mind (Bartlett, 1932 (Bartlett, /1961 . Schemata in such a view (i.e., Bartlett's) are not knowledge structures stored in the brains or minds of individuals for the interpretation of experience, but functional properties of adaptations between persons and their physical and social environments. (p. 202) For Bartlett, schemas highlighted the reciprocity between culture and memory. Schemas were necessary to explain the constitutive role of culturally organized experience in individual sense making. This early use of the term suggested a transactional relationship between individual knowledge and cultural practice.
Contemporaries of Bartlett (e.g., Dewey, Bentley, and Rosenblatt) developed psychological and literary theories that explicitly used the concept of transactionalism. It is clear from Rosenblatt's (1989) definition of transaction, below, that the spirit of transactionalism was reflected in Bartlett's initial construction of the concept of schemas:
Instead of separate, already defined entities acting on one another (an interaction), Dewey and Bentley (1949, p. 69) suggested that the term transaction be used to designate relationships in which each element conditions and is conditioned by the other in a mutually constituted situation. This view requires a break with entrenched habits of thinking. The old stimulus-response, subject-object, individual-social dualisms give way to a recognition that such relationships take place in a context that also enters into the event. Human activities and relationships are seen as transactions in which the individual and the social, cultural, and natural elements interfuse. (italics added; Rosenblatt, 1989, p. 154) Schema was also the central mediational construct in Jean Piaget's (1952) structural theory of the origins and development of cognition. For Piaget, development was interpreted as an ongoing dialectic in which the individual either assimilates new experience consistent with existing schemas or changes (i.e., accommodates) schemas to fit his or her experience. What is more, Piaget emphasized the embodied nature of schema formation by calling attention to the importance of sensory-motor schemata in an individual's early development. But we find it interesting that, although Piaget shared the individualistic bias of cognitive scientists, the latter seem to have been little influenced by either the developmental or the embodied dimensions of Piaget's conceptions of schemas.
Central to our discussion in this article is the recognition that the early development and use of the schema construct had its origin in efforts to understand individual thought processes as inextricably embedded in cultural life. Individual knowledge schemas were transactionally linked to culturally organized experience.
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In the analysis that follows, we argue that this connection was lost in later applications of schema to the reading process. In fact, after a close examination of Bartlett's work and some of his experiments, Beals (1998) wrote:
Unfortunately, this view of schema as shaped by culture is not included in some current versions of schema theory. Although Bartlett is widely cited as the source of the term schema as a model for the organization of memory, the application of the concept to much cognitive science and psychological theory and research washes out the "essentially social character" (p. 225) of schema to which Bartlett (1932) pointed. (p. 10) We now turn toward exploration of modern conceptions and applications of schema in cognitive psychology, including some of the limitations of schema theoretic perspectives.
Schema Theoretic Perspectives in the 1970s and '80s
Contemporary conceptions of schema derive primarily from work conducted in cognitive science during the 1970s. As we begin our exploration of schema theory within cognitive psychology, several definitions may be helpful. Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) defined schemas as "data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. They exist for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions" (p. 101). Brewer and Nakamura (1984) , in an attempt to address the role of schema in remem-bering knowledge and constructing new knowledge, wrote: "In brief, [schemas] are higher-order cognitive structures that have been hypothesized to underlie many aspects of human knowledge and skill. They serve a crucial role in providing an account of how old knowledge interacts with new knowledge in perception, language, thought, and memory" (p. 120). These definitions highlight several important features of schemas as noted by Rumelhart (1984) :
• Schemas have variables.
• Schemas can be embedded, one within another.
• Schemas represent knowledge at all levels of abstraction.
• Schemas represent knowledge rather than definitions [italics in the original].
• Schemas are active processes.
• Schemas are recognition devices whose processing is aimed at the evaluation of their goodness of fit to the data being process. (Rumelhart, 1984, p. 169) Although much of the early work on schema theory in the 1970s was published by cognitive scientists exploring knowledge construction through computer metaphors (e.g., Minsky, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1975; Winograd, 1975) , such theories were readily applied to the study of reading. Cognitive scientists studying story schemas provided a clear link between schema theory and reading research in comprehension by exploring story structure and recall (e.g., Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975) . Other scholars (e.g., Anderson, 1977 Anderson, , 1978 Anderson & Pearson, 1984; Bransford & Johnson, 1972 , 1973 , working primarily on investigations of reading comprehension, contributed significantly to the work on schemas and helped bring schema research into mainstream reading research.
Perhaps the best summary of schema theory and its importance for the reading field comes from Pearson (1992) , who observed: " Anderson and Pearson's (1984) schema-theoretic account of reading comprehension typifies the cognitively oriented version of this [reading] model, with its twin emphases on prior knowledge (as a resource) and inference (as a process) in directing the construction of meaning" (p. 1075). Pearson's summary emphasizes the cognitive processes that are to some degree made visible by schema theory. Elsewhere, Anderson and Pearson explain that schema theory is "a model for representing how knowledge is stored in human memory" (1984, p. 259) ; and later, "the reader's schema is a structure that facilitates planful retrieval of text information from memory and permits reconstruction of elements that were not learned or have been forgotten" (p. 285).
Schema theory was a major force in the development of reading models and had an important influence on research, particularly in relation to reading comprehension and learning. It provided researchers and teachers with a model for representing knowledge and organizing experience. It also provided a window into how individuals might transfer and generate knowledge, for example, by explaining how a schema for a cup would help an individual understand other containers. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, scholars (e.g., Anderson, 1977 Anderson, , 1978 Pitchert & Anderson, 1977) conducted groundbreaking research in the role of schema in stories and the reading process. Scholars also wrote articles for teachers (e.g., Hacker, 1980; Pearson, 1982 (Gaffney & Anderson, 2000) .
Limitations of Schema Theory and Studies of Schema
Although schema theory obviously had an impact on the study of reading processes, the construct of schema and the theories describing schema activation and use had limitations that were noted by both proponents and critics. Early definitions of schema theory, for example, presented schemas as fixed, rigid structures (Schank & Abelson, 1977) , but, as Kintsch (1998) noted, such rigid definitions were quickly revised to include more loosely defined structures. Despite this change, studies of schema tended to be limited in a number of ways. We provide a brief review of some of the criticisms of schema theory, using a study by Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977) that has often been cited by reading researchers.
In this study, Anderson et al. presented music students and weightlifters with ambiguous passages and found that the students' experiences and knowledge influenced their interpretations of the passages. That is, the music students typically read the ambiguous passage (Appendix A) as a story about four friends getting together on the weekend to play music. Weightlifters reading the same passage tended to read it as a passage about playing cards. Concomitantly, the music students read another ambiguous passage as referring to a prison break, whereas the weight-lifters read it as referring to wrestling (Appendix B). One of the strengths of schema theory in this study and in others is that it provided a way of thinking about prior knowledge in text interpretation and how an individual's experience (e.g., as a weight-lifter or a flutist) would shape their interpretation of text. Most critics of schema theory accept and acknowledge the importance of schema in providing a means of describing and thinking about prior knowledge in text interpretation and how an individual's experience would shape his or her interpretation of text (see Carver, 1992 , for an alternative viewpoint), but detractors raise numerous other criticisms, summarized below.
Many schema-related studies, including the one above, have relied on what Sadoski et al. (1991) refer to as "bizarre texts" (p. 469). Bizarre texts are ambiguous, containing few or no concrete referents. Such texts are useful in activating particular schemas as they relate to a person's experience or prior knowledge, but these ambiguous texts differ from naturally occurring texts, which contain specific referents even when they are challenging because of their content, specialized discourse, or reading level. Responses to bizarre texts tend to activate pre-existing default schemas and thus do not account for the more rich, complex, diversified types of knowledge that are stored when a person reads other texts or encounters other less constrained circumstances (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Nasajii, 2002) . Because the ambiguous texts are specialized and involve particular comprehension processes, schema theory does little, argues Carver (1992) , to explain the "normal, typical, or ordinary reading-called rauding" (p. 165). Studies such as the one with the musicians and wrestlers make clear the importance of a reader's personal background and surrounding contexts, but are further limited because they raise questions about how relevant and generalizable findings are for "the reading of naturally occurring texts" (Sadoski et al., p. 470 ; see also Alba & Hasher, 1983) . Moreover, despite some notable exceptions, which we will address momentarily, most studies of schema are limited because of relying on experimental procedures rather than community-based or classroom-based settings and tasks.
To address a number of limitations of schema theoretic perspectives, some researchers have proposed alternative theories, often from an associationist or connectionist perspective. Sadoski and Paivio (2001) proposed Dual Coding Theory (DCT) as an alternative to schema theoretic perspectives. DCT focuses on areas related to verbal and nonverbal encoding and to the role of imagery in reading and writing. This attention to imagery is something that other researchers have not taken into account. Sadoski and Paivio eschew the use of the term schema as they contrast DCT with a number of perspectives on reading and writing that make use of the term schema. Kintsch (1998) , on the other hand, continues to use the term, while noting its limitations as he proposes a "construction-integration (CI) model" (p. 94). Kintsch observes that schemas, as traditionally conceived of in connection with comprehension, have been seen largely as top-down processes that are tightly controlled, whereas a substantial amount of research indicates "the need for conceiving of comprehension as a more bottom-up, loosely structured process" (p. 94). Kintsch contrasts schemas, which he calls "fixed control structures" (p. 94), with comprehension, which he describes as "incredibly flexible and context-sensitive" (p. 94). His model incorporates schema but is broader and more complex than traditional schema theoretic perspectives.
Our review of the limitations of schema theory and alternative views is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, we wish to point out some of the limitations and to note two, in particular, that are most relevant to the work we have taken up in this article. In addition to the rigidity of schemas as traditionally conceived, scholars have noted that issues of schema construction and activation are problematic. For example, research, such as that with the musicians and wrestlers described earlier, has focused on schema activation, not creation. This poses the problem of needing to "fill slots in schemata ad infinitum" (Nassaji, 2002, p. 445) . In this article we do not address the issue of schemas endlessly deferred but are more interested in the question of the origins and development of schemas. In what do schemas have their origins? Traditional schema studies have done little to address this question.
In addressing this question, we are interested in the role of social and cultural factors. Although various definitions of schema and the numerous critiques of schema suggest attention to both individual and social contexts, cultural and social factors typically are acknowledged by schema theorists, and by many of their critics, as just another set of variables (Middelton & Crook, 1996) .
We do not mean to suggest that researchers have not investigated schema and its relationship to culture. For example, in an international, cross-cultural study, Pritchard (1990) examined how cultural schemas influenced 11th-grade readers from the United States and from the Pacific island nation of Palau. Steffenson, Joag-Dev, and Anderson (1979) examined Indian and American university students' understandings as they read culturally familiar and unfamiliar passages about weddings. Yet few studies using schema theory have examined how various cultural groups within the United States interpret texts. A notable exception is preliminary research reported by Anderson (1994) that investigated how Black and White teenagers perceived passages involving "sounding," the good-natured exchange of insults in the Black community (see Reynolds, Taylor, Steffensen, Shirey, & Anderson, 1981 , 1982 ; see also Lee, 1995) . It is noteworthy that this particular investigation explored a community-based practice rather than a school text, and as Anderson notes, "It remains to be seen how much school reading material is culturally loaded" (p. 478). Anderson's comments alert us to the need to explore cultural and social factors not as background variables but as integral components of schema in their own right.
The Influence of Sociocultural Perspectives: Reading as Social, Contextualized Practice
Although schema theory helped researchers and theorists to think about the inner workings of the mind and how knowledge is stored in memory, changes, and is used in comprehending texts, the theory as taken up during the cognitive revolution largely marginalized the role of the individual's social and cultural life. Experience figured prominently in schema theory, but the version of culture implied by schema theoretic models, and by some alternative models, is vastly oversimplified when compared with the increasingly complex, and contested, views of culture that were emerging from anthropologists (e.g., Clifford, 1988; Clifford & Marcus, 1986) , from cultural psychologists (Scribner & Cole, 1981) , and from the work of educational anthropologists (e.g., Au, 1980; Heath, 1983; Watson-Gegeo & Boggs, 1977) who were exploring literacy processes during the 1970s and '80s.
A number of theoretical, methodological, and contextual factors converged during the 1970s and '80s to facilitate a greater consideration of social factors in literacy development. There were increasing concerns about issues of culture and language in educational settings and in relation to populations that had not achieved school success. These concerns emerged while Vygotsky's works were becoming more widely available in English (Moll, 2001 ). In addition, to explore issues of language and culture in teaching and learning, some researchers turned to ethnographic methodologies, creating a more interdisciplinary study of literacy. Writing about this shift in reading research, Florio-Ruane and McVee (2000) observed, "Researchers from a hybrid of traditions including anthropology and psychology have probed how literacy as both cultural tool and cultural practice is influenced by social and historical factors as well as the micro-politics of face to face interaction (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1981; Moll, 1992 )" (p. 158). Increasingly, researchers turned toward exploring the tools and signs related to literacy practices situated within particular contexts and activities. Within the United States, researchers also turned to the work of other Russian activity theorists and psychologists, particularly as their work was interpreted by American scholars (e.g., Cole, 1996; Moll, 1990; Scribner & Cole, 1981; Wertsch, 1985 Wertsch, , 1991 Although research explicitly based on schema theory continued into the late 1980s and 1990s, it was from the mid-1970s through the early 1980s that the most theory and research were generated from schema theoretic perspectives and the findings most often actively applied to the study of reading processes. Pearson (1992) observed that although more research on basic reading processes was actually conducted in the 1980s, this work did not dominate then as it had in the 1970s. Among other causes, Pearson attributes this development to the increasing attention focused on the social and cultural factors related to literacy (e.g., Au, 1980; Au & Mason, 1981; Cazden, 1988; Heath, 1983; Moll & Diaz, 1987) . As a result, research focused on models and theories of reading processes became "old news." Finally, and perhaps as an outgrowth of the focus on social and cultural factors, research on the basic reading process "was recaptured by the cognitive psychology community and tended to be reported in journals and edited volumes with more of a cognitive science focus" (Pearson, 1992 (Pearson, , p. 1077 . In fact, although many cognitive scientists have continued extending and elaborating their work, particularly through connectionist theory (e.g., Rumelhart, 1990 Rumelhart, , 1994 Ramsey, Stich, & Rumelhart, 1991) , this later work has not yet had the same amount of influence on the literacy field as the main body of work developed earlier by cognitive scientists. Even theories that are specific in addressing the limitations of schema theory (e.g., Carver, 1992; Kintsch, 1998; Sadoski & Paivio, 2001) , have met with limited uptake in relation to recent literacy research and practice in the broader literacy community.
As Pearson suggested, because cognitive accounts of reading processes failed to address the sociocultural dimensions of literacy that anthropologists and sociologists were uncovering, parallel lines of research emerged. It may be that these parallel lines simply mirrored the dualism between individual and social perspectives that characterized cognitive psychology. In his criticism of the cognitive revolution and the metaphor of mind as computer, Bruner (1990) wrote: "There could be no place for 'mind' in such a system-'mind' in the sense of intentional states like believing, desiring, intending, grasping a meaning" (p. 8). Computational models of mind, as presented by cognitive scientists, have represented individual knowledge as existing distinct from, and thus portable across, sociocultural contexts. Absent is the constitutive force of the social-that schemas are cultural historical constructions that emerge only within the individual through transactions with others.
Although many cite Bartlett or Kant as early proponents of the term schema, Anderson and Pearson (1984) wrote that "the full development of schema theory as a model for representing how knowledge is stored in human memory had to await the revolution in our conception of how humans process information spurred by the thinking of computer scientists doing simulations of human cognition (e.g., Minsky, 1975; Winograd, 1975)" (p. 259) . The model of the mind as machine, as information processor, is largely accepted to be at odds with sociocultural perspectives, although there are several scholars who have written persuasively about what they learned from both perspectives (cf. Beals, 1998; Frawley, 1997) . Clearly, there are some major differences between these paradigms. A view of mind predicated on an information-processing model is critically at odds with sociocultural perspectives that assert that the genesis of thought, language, and, therefore, development lies in social and cultural activity. 4 Social and cultural considerations are therefore the most critical and essential factors in schema acquisition. It is not enough to acknowledge the role of the social and cultural at the margins of cognition. Rather, as Wertsch (1991) has noted, we must explore how social and cultural tools and activity mediate learning and development. Thus the genesis of individual literacy knowledge is situated in the sociocultural milieu and is inextricably tied to the milieu's discourse practices, mediational tools, and cultural artifacts, which have both a material and an ideational character. Both ideal and material tools are always value-laden because they are shaped by relationships within and among people. People position these tools according to sociocultural norms governing the activity in the moment.
In the next section we discuss contributions that sociocultural perspectives can make to our understandings of schema, and we also suggest some ways that schema theory might help us to think about sociocultural perspectives. We raise issues related to the origins and development of schemas as mediated by material and ideational tools and by embodiment, and as cultural processes of social-individual origin that have both public and private dimensions.
Sociocultural Perspectives on Schema
Addressing the Genetic Question: The Origins and Development of Schemas
The cognitivism of most cognitive science approaches has generally been premised on a rationalist worldview that is inherently dualistic. In such a view, the active individual-as-knower is generally assumed to stand separate and apart from the world-as-known, such that the former is able to represent the latter through his or her schematic representations. In such a view, mind is hyper-rationalized, that is, an overemphasis is placed on cognitive structures and processes within the individual. In contrast, transactionalist perspectives-such as those held by Dewey and Bentley (1949) , Gee (1992 Gee ( , 1997a Gee ( , 1997b Gee ( , 2000 Gee ( , 2004 , Smagorinsky (2001) , and Vygotsky (1978 Vygotsky ( , 1986 )-generally assume that the knower and the known, the person and the environment, including other individuals, are mutually constitutive of each other. This perspective carries profound implications for how we conceptualize the origins and development of representational constructs such as schema. Rather than perceiving schema or cognitive structures as in-the-head representations of something out there in the world, thus separating knower and known, the transactional nature of knowing acknowledges that the dualistic separation of subject and object is "not given and ready-made; [dualism] is an idea that belongs to the human history of mind and nature" (Varela, Thompson, & Rosh, 1991, p. 141) .
In contrast to a transactional view, schema theory as developed in the 1970s and '80s posited that meaning was stored in mental structures, which in turn were activated and organized during the reading process. Reading became the unique arrangement of mental structures as elicited by any particular text, as opposed to being inextricably situated in the process of the interaction between texts and schema. Meanings in the head, though shaped by experience, were nonetheless viewed as having an existence independent of any particular embodied activity. Although this explains the relationship between past and present experience and the conventionalization of experience into scripts, frames, and roles that represent our understanding of what is and could be, it does not account for the origins and development of these mental structures.
Indeed, the genetic question is not one that was identified as a primary concern to schema theorists. The primary challenge for schema theorists, as Anderson and Pearson (1984) described it, was to give specificity to "the form and substance of schema" and to specify the processes that allowed for schema use (p. 259). Anderson and Pearson and others emphasize the application of schemas to reading processes with scant attention to the origins and development of schemas. In addition, schema development has been described as reorganization of existing mental structures; new schemas are created only by analogy or reconfiguration of old ones. Yet the origin of these schemas is not accounted for. As stated by Rochelle and Clancy (1992) , "Researchers may ask, 'What is the raw material of reasoning?' (Koedinger & Anderson, 1990 ), but they tend to give one choice-varieties of representations. Schema models of learning involve perceptible features but deal only with a priori representations of experience (Schank & Abelson, 1977 )" (p. 448). Thus they do not address the origins and processes by which schema develop. Hatano (1993) has argued that as researchers have begun to study teaching and learning from a constructivist stance, as opposed to a transmission-oriented stance, they need to further refine their understanding of Vygotsky's theory to more fully "explain the sociogenesis of individual cognition from the constructivist point of view" (p. 164). One of the ways to do this is by investigating and describing the "material upon which constructive mental processes work" (Resnick, 1987, in Hatano, p. 164) . Hatano urges scholars to specify in greater detail the "nature of the material and how it is worked on by an active mind" (italics added; p. 164). In other words, if researchers think about schemas from a sociocultural perspective, this involves rethinking both the nature of schemas (i.e., What are the salient features of schemas from a sociocultural perspective?) and their use (i.e., What are the mediational features of schemas? How do schemas function as mediational tools?). To further explore the cultural and environmental materials and their role in cognition implies exploring learning and cognition not as contained within an individual but as created in the interaction between material and activity. Holland and Cole (1995) suggest that schemas represent the ideal-that is, conceptual-aspects of cognition, whereas discourse represents the material aspects. Both serve as artifacts-collective tools with histories and functions that are continually modified within social practices-to mediate human cognition. Understanding that cognitive activity in any single instance is mediated by the ideal as well as the material aspects of cultural artifacts affords opportunities to attend to the ways in which individual motivations and intentions and the rules governing social activity reflect the essentially dialogic nature of meaning making. Holland and Cole suggest that although schemas attend to the habitual forms of behavior, they "always must be woven to the particulars of a situation" (p. 480). Elsewhere, Cole (1996) explains that, defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply with equal force whether one is considering languages or more mundane forms of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. What differentiates the word "table" from an actual table is the relative prominence of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of coordinations they afford. No word exists apart from its material instantiation, whereas every table embodies an order imposed by thinking human beings. (p. 117).
Cognition and the Role of Ideal and Material Cultural Artifacts
Vygotsky also recognized that words are imbued with psychological sense and not just meaning as linguistically defined. "The sense of a word . . . is the sum of all the psychological events aroused in our consciousness by the word. It is a dynamic, fluid, complex whole, which has several zones of unequal stability. Meaning is only one of the zones of sense, the most stable and precise zone" (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 146) . No single definition can ever capture the full sense of a word. Word meanings are indeterminate. It is only within the rules of the language game that meanings arise (Wittgenstein, 1961) . This shifts the focus of our investigations and the unit of analysis away from the mental processes alone toward examination of activities or events. Of this shift Rogoff (1993) writes, "An important perspective that results from using the dynamic event/activity as unit of analysis is a shift from considering cognition as a collection of mental possessions (such as thoughts, schemas, memories, scripts, and plans) to regarding cognition as the active process of solving mental and other problems (e.g., by thinking, recounting, remembering, organizing, planning, and contemplating), generally in the service of intelligent action" (p. 124).
It is only by attending to the materiality of artifacts that we can explore the way cognitive processes are dependent on the social and physical practices that both enable and constrain the meaning potential. Many investigations of literacy (e.g., Heath, 1983; Moll, 1994; Purcell-Gates, 1995; Watson-Gegeo & Boggs, 1977) have demonstrated the ways that various speech communities offer students different (not less) ideational and material artifacts to mediate their understanding and experience of any text activity. These examples of work related to the discursive aspects of meaning making further problematize psychological explanations of schemas that treat culture as a variable within, rather than a constituent of, mental representations. They are also important because they draw our attention to the power contained in such tools, as particular tools can either facilitate or constrain our participation in particular activities. This is particularly relevant in educational arenas where the use of particular tools can lead to the labeling of some students as successful, even gifted, while others are labeled as at risk or struggling.
One example of the need to focus on both the material and ideal comes from Wertsch's (1998) interpretation of research conducted by Beck and colleagues (Beck & McKeown, 1994; Beck, McKeown, & Gromoll, 1989; Beck, McKeown, Sinatra, & Loxterman, 1991) . These researchers argue that students could not make connections between events presented in the texts in a coherent way because the texts themselves were inadequate; that is, the history texts did not have textual coherence. The researchers also argued that teachers try to cover too much material. This in turn thwarts students' attempts to make connections. Wertsch interprets these studies by using narrative as a cultural tool that mediates students' understandings of the text and of history. He writes:
In terms of mediated action, the point is that students had not mastered the cultural tool-namely, a historical narrative-and for this reason they could not take advantage of the affordances this cultural tool offered as they sought to carry out the form of mediated action involved in reproducing accounts of the American Revolution. These students knew too little in the sense that they had not mastered the narrative form that consists of an ensemble of interrelationships organized into a single whole. (Wertsch, 1998, p.87) Wertsch acknowledges that the students have mastered other narrative forms and understand them. What is different here is that the specific form, a historical narrative, has not been mastered. This is similar to the problem cited by Bransford (1983) : that packets of information in texts may appear unrelated to students. The great difficulty lies not in presenting students with more information but in providing for them a means to recognize and construct the relationships between various bits of information-that is, weaving the strands of information into a coherent schema that facilitates students' understandings of content. Wertsch makes a similar point when he writes that, "unless it is integrated into a coherent schema (i.e., a narrative, in the cases that I am considering), information is very hard to comprehend and retain" (1998, p. 86).
Schemas as Embodied
The effort to construct knowledge relationships is affected not only by the material and ideal tools that a learner has access to but also by the character of embodied learning and embodied interaction. In the following extended quotation, Johnson (cited in Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) 
explains:
Meaning includes patterns of embodied experience and preconceptual structures of our sensibility (i.e., our mode of perception, or orienting ourselves, and of interacting with other objects, events, or persons). These embodied patterns do not remain private or peculiar to the person who experiences them. Our community helps us interpret and codify many of our felt patterns. They become shared cultural modes of experience and help to determine the nature of our meaningful, coherent understanding of our "world." (p. 150) Johnson (1987) proposes a meaning for schemas that differs in an important way from that offered by cognitive scientists. In contrast to the symbolic or propositional nature of schemas conceptualized by cognitive scientists, Johnson maintains that embodied schemas are "constantly operating in our perception, bodily movement through space, and physical manipulation of objects" (p. 23). This perspective on the role of embodiment is further elaborated in Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) 
groundbreaking book Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought.
Such a view foregrounds the ways in which meaning is shaped not just by experience as recollected, by reified event structures, or by material and ideal artifacts, but also by embodied experience and the ways in which that embodied experience is shaped by others in our social community. In such a view, "cultural modes of experience" act as one means of mediating our perceptions of the world. In turn, cultural modes shape, and are shaped by, both the ideal and the material artifacts that we make use of.
There is growing attention to the embodiment of human cognition (e.g., Clark, 1997; Johnson, 1987) , although attention to issues of embodiment is not new. William James (1890) wrote that "we sense our bodily selves as the seat of our thinking" (cited in Rosenblatt, 1989, p. 245) , and thus he suggests that when we look at a tree stump and think of it as a chair, we reveal the relationship between our inner world and the external workings of it through a bodily form. Similarly, consider Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) assertion that not only is all language metaphorical, but our metaphors emerge through our physical activity in the world. They note that metaphors are grounded by virtue of systematic correlates with experience. . . . We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more basic than other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural or whatever. . . . Rather what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical-that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated." (italics in the original; p. 58)
A shortcoming of schema theory as traditionally conceived by cognitive science is that it implies an understanding of literacy as unconnected to embodied material experience. Recently, Gee (2004) made this point in writing about traditional views of cognition and learning, particularly learning to read:
Learning does not work well when learners are forced to check their bodies at the schoolroom door like guns in the old West. School learning is often about disembodied minds learning outside any context of decisions and actions. When people learn something as a cultural process their bodies are involved because cultural learning always involves having specific experiences that facilitate learning, not just memorizing words.
Traditionalists treat learning to read as if "read" was an intransitive verb. People just "read." But no one just reads; rather they read something. (italics in the original; Gee, 2004, p. 39) Rather than the embodied, situated approach described by Gee, cognitive versions of schema theory privilege literacy, and to some extent language, as if it were divorced from use and practice.
Consider, for example, the way in which many experiments on schema have been carried out. Most have been conducted in laboratory settings with adults who have been asked to read one or perhaps several narrative passages related to already existing, or default, schemas (Nassaji, 2002) . Although such investigations were necessary to define and explore schemas as constructs and to determine how schemas are activated and applied, they have also put forward a relatively narrow view of schema activation and construction that emphasizes the individual. In this sense, we might say that schema theoretic views have hyper-rationalized literacy processes, foregrounding the cognitive at the expense of the material. Yet language is a way of doing things in the world. The determination that a child is having difficulty comprehending some particular text well involves judgments about the values, norms, roles, and goals that position the child in a particular way with respect to a text. The discourse processes required in the moment are embedded in cultural histories not just of individuals but of kinship groups, social classes, and political ideologies. It is not merely words but social and cultural practices, opportunities, and interactions that must be provided. In addition, these experiences, opportunities, and interactions must allow for a child to engage with a range of mediational artifacts, both material and ideal, thus tying language to authentic material and cognitive practices and embodied activity. Schemas, as traditionally conceived of in relation to reading, were limited to inthe-head categories, in part, because they were removed from materiality connected to cultural context and processes.
The Origins and Development of Schemas as a Cultural Process
Cognition as cultural process implies a social conception of mind. Gee (1997b) characterized the social mind and its ability to interpret the world as a pattern recognizer:
Because the world is infinitely full of potentially meaningful patterns and subpatterns in any domain, something must guide the learner in selecting the patterns and subpatterns to focus on. This something resides in the cultural models of the learner's sociocultural groups and the practices and settings in which they are rooted. Because the mind is a pattern recognizer and there are infinite ways to pattern features of the world, of necessity, although perhaps ironically, the mind is social (really, cultural) in the sense that sociocultural practice and settings guide the patterns in terms of which the learner thinks acts, talks values, and interacts. (p. 240) Acting as a "pattern recognizer," the mind guides learners in accordance with perceived cultural patterns, not just in the head but in the world. Mind, in Gee's portrayal, reflects the embodied nature of knowing socially and culturally as one interacts with the world. Meaning is not just in the head or in the body, but in the world. That is, meaning does not exist in the form of words or even images, but within our relationships among and across experiences, actions, talk, people, and all sorts of culturally situated knowledge (Gee, 2004) . As Gavelek and Raphael (1996) have observed, "through our interactions with more knowledgeable others, we acquire the culturally variable and historically changing higher psychological functions that make possible the intelligence unique to humankind. The higher psychological processes that define us as cultural beings thus emerge from, but are not reducible to, the elementary psychological processes that characterize us as biological beings" (p. 184).
Sociocultural theorists argue that schemas emerge from the social interactions between an individual and his environment. This is the same principle that operates in Vygotsky's general law of cultural development. Vygotsky (1978) wrote: "Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological). . . . All higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals" (italics in the original; p. 57). Vygotsky's general law of cultural development underscores the importance of the roles of both the social and the individual. The Vygotsky Space (see Figure 1) , adapted from Harré (1984) by Gavelek and Raphael (1996) , aids visualization of the myriad ways that the social and the individual come into play as knowledge is constructed and internalized. The model draws our attention to one of the basic principles of internalization as described by Robbins (2003) : "The key aspect of internalization is the rooting or the process of ingrowth that leads to personal transformation. Internalization is not understood as a reflection of the external, but rather a transformation of the external" (p. 31). The Vygotsky Space model provides opportunities for thinking about knowledge construction as an evolution of both internalized and externalized knowledge processes that include individual and social considerations.
The four quadrants of the Vygotsky space (Figure 1a) are formed by the intersection of two orthogonal dimensions, one public ←→ private dimension and a second social ←→ individual dimension (arrows indicate two-way interaction). Together these two dimensions create four "spaces": (1) public-social, (2) privatesocial, (3) private-individual, and (4) public-individual. The origins and development of a person's cognitive processes and structures proceed iteratively through Quadrants I through IV and are characterized by four corresponding transitions: (1) appropriation (Q I -Q II ), in which an individual appropriates certain ways of thinking acquired discursively in interaction with others; (2) transformation (Q II -Q III ), in which an individual transforms and takes ownership of these previously appropriated ways of thinking; (3) publication (Q III -Q IV ), in which an individual goes public or makes observable through talk or actions, or both, his or her thinking that was previously private; and (4) conventionalization (Q IV -Q I ), the process whereby these public ways of thinking become conventionalized as part of the individual's own thinking and that of others. The origins, development, and transformation of schematic ways of thinking can be understood as the iterative movement through these quadrants that define the Vygotsky space. Through this movement, an individual's cognitive structures (i.e., schemas) and processes emerge from, but are not reducible to, his or her interactions with others.
Consider, for example, fifth-grade students engaging in book clubs to learn new content related to literacy and social studies (e.g., how to discuss a book, historical fiction as a genre, developments leading to the U.S. Civil War, the meaning of "Con-federate" and "Union"). In this context a student, Jason, has the opportunity to use public discourse, such as written book logs and talk about text, to engage in social knowledge construction with others in the public sphere (Q I ) and, at the same time, to use these tools (e.g., writing, discourse, reflection) to make connections through Harré (1984) ; the figure on which this adaptation is based originally appeared in Gavelek & Raphael (1996 ), p. 186. Copyright 1996 his thinking (Q II -Q III ). Part and parcel of this process is the extent to which he is able to transform and apply what he has appropriated. In Q IV and Q I again, interpsychological engagement helps provide opportunities for the ongoing, iterative mediation and elaboration of Jason's knowledge. For example, if Jason is struggling to understand what he has read, discussing a text with more knowledgeable peers in a book club group may provide scaffolding to support Jason's comprehension. In this circumstance his learning is mediated by written language (the printed text), oral language (discussion), and numerous other tools both ideal (e.g., word sense, schemas) and material (e.g., discourse, paper). Social interactions facilitate Jason's internalization of various kinds of knowledge and provide the basis on which he and other students interact with that knowledge at an individual level (Q II and Q III ). For example, through writing Jason may take a construct acquired in the public setting (e.g., writing reading logs as responses to text) and then transform it through private cognitive activity (i.e., by inventing a new reading log focused on the titles across various texts). The point here is that it is not that the public interactions are more important than the cognitive processes, but rather that cognition is a culturally situated process involving mental problem solving in a particular context. Such a view contrasts with traditional perspectives of cognition, which portray cognition as a set of independent, decontextualized mental representations (Rogoff, 1993) . This is congruent with what Gutiérrez, Baquendano-Lopez, and Tuner (1997) label the "third space." In such a space, "learning takes precedence over teaching; instruction is consciously local, contingent, situated, and strategic" (p. 372). In Jason's case, he is introduced to reading logs as a convention used by students and teachers in book club discussions (Q I ). Over time, he appropriates this particular convention, becoming familiar with multiple forms and functions of reading logs (Q II ). In introducing his own format for a reading log, he has transformed the idea originally presented to him (Q III ). Jason shares this new type of reading log with his teacher and classmates as a means of knowledge sharing or publication (Q IV ). His learning is based on a repertoire of socially situated skills and behaviors as well as on knowledge about language. In this context, Jason has the opportunity to act as both novice and expert. The Vygotsky Space model represents the recursive nature of Jason's learning, but readers should note that the model is limited by its two-dimensional presentation. Figure 1b represents a three-dimensional model that highlights the recursive nature of knowledge construction and internalization. One of the limits of this model is that it still appears that each axis and quadrant must be activated in sequence while internalizing any concept. However, knowledge construction is obviously more complex than as portrayed in Figure 1a . For example, we might actually find situations where particular knowledge conventions are appropriated but not publicized (e.g., where a student can recognize and construct a mental character map but does not write the character map down or publicize his knowledge), or appropriated but not transformed (e.g., a student who always follows the model of reading logs supplied by the teacher). In addition, in Jason's case, the new knowledge that he has constructed about the writing convention of reading logs can be represented one way in the Vygotsky Space, whereas his understanding of other content knowledge (e.g., reasons for the Civil War) might be represented another way by using the Vygotsky Space model. The Vygotsky Space portrays the continuum of knowledge construction through public ←→ private, social ←→ individual domains. In public cognitive activity, the teacher can assist students in making visible what are typically invisible, private processes. For example, Jason's teacher Mrs. Pardo could ask him to do a think aloud about his reading log to describe how he came up with the idea for a new reading log format and his purpose in doing so. However, her access to the private cognitive domain is limited. As noted by Gavelek and Raphael (1996) , "When cognitive activity is private, the thinking can only be inferred-for example, by reading something a child has written (i.e., inferring, based on that public performance, what might have preceded it" (pp. 186-187).
In this regard, teachers do not have access to the intramental processes of concept formation but might infer them from work made public by the student. The Vygotsky Space, in Quadrants II and III, draws our attention to where sociocognitive processes go underground, within the individual. Two considerations are worth noting. The first is that there is no schism that exists between the public-private and external-internal realms, a consideration that Vygotsky himself has noted (1986). The second consideration is that Vygotsky described a multifaceted process for knowledge construction involving multiple phases and stages (1986, pp. 110-126) .
As acknowledged above, we feel that schema theory can help literacy researchers attend to both the material and ideal in tool use. Holland and Cole (1995) acknowledged a similar contribution when they wrote:
Taken together, the ideas of cultural schemas and cultural models appear to offer a congenial set of linkages between culture and mental structure. But, as ordinarily interpreted, the ideas of cultural model, schema, and script differ from our characterization of artifacts presented here in on a crucial respect: they are widely interpreted as ideal, conceptual, "in the head" phenomena, both by psychologists (e.g., Rumelhart, 1978; Schank & Abelson, 1977) and anthropologists (D' Andrade, 1984; Quinn & Holland, 1987) . We insist that in practice cultural artifacts always have a material as well as an ideal aspect. (p. 480) We see a second potential contribution of schema theory in helping sociocultural researchers to address unfinished explorations of scientific and spontaneous concepts (Vygotsky, 1986) . Everyday concepts are those that are formed through our experience with the world-again, our embodied experience. The relationship between everyday concepts and scientific or systematic concepts, associated with higher-order thinking, has not been clearly established. Schema theory may be one means of more clearly understanding these constructs and their relationship as it draws our attention to private cognitive processes.
If we think of schema as embodied and not just in the head, then it becomes clear that patterns of enactment, ways of engaging the world, both shape our interpretation of cultural activity and are shaped by cultural activity. This requires very different ways of thinking about teaching and learning. Not only must teachers scaffold and model for students, but they must also be cognizant of the role of schemas as embodied social and cultural constructs that mediate students' learning. Here, a distinction needs to be made between schema as an organizational feature that the mind imposes on experience and schema as a mental representation that mediates activity. Teachers must provide meaningful contexts where students engage with cultural activities and materials (e.g., written and spoken language, texts, and questions) in ways that help students to understand and internalize patterns embodied in the cultural materials and activities that facilitate success in U.S. schools. At the same time, it is critical that teachers recognize the political nature of this reality. All cultural activity is imbued with and linked to power; therefore, schemas can assist a learner in accessing relevant knowledge, or culturally situated schemas may cause confusion or even precipitate resistance. Such is the political nature of schemas.
We now turn to an example from classroom practice to explore the various theoretical points introduced in the previous sections.
Using Schema Theory to Explore an Example of Classroom Practice
We have adapted the following description of a classroom interaction and one student's response to it from Brock (1997) and Brock and Raphael (2005) , with the authors' permission. In the scene below, Brock (1997) described how Deng, a student of Hmong descent, responded to an activity related to the book Maniac Magee that Mrs. Weber and her class had been reading. Mrs. Weber used the book to foreground issues of racial prejudice and homelessness as part of a unit that explored race and racism in America. Along with reading Maniac Magee, students listened to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech and engaged in teacher-directed discussion related to the speech and in other discussions and activities to help them understand key concepts presented in the unit. During this unit students needed to draw on prior knowledge; students needed to construct or apply schemas to comprehend text and classroom activities. In this way, the vignette typifies many of the literate activities involving schema use in classroom settings. In the following excerpt, Mrs. Weber reads from a section of Maniac Magee:
Maniac loved the colors of the East End, the people colors. For the life of him, he couldn't figure why these East Enders called themselves black. He kept looking and looking, and the colors he found were gingersnap and light fudge and dark fudge and acorn and butter rum and cinnamon and burnt orange. But never licorice, which, to him, was real black. (Spinelli, 1990, p. 51; quoted in Brock, p. 128) Brock describes the classroom interaction and response to the passage:
Mrs. Weber paused shortly after reading the above segment and said, "I want to stop there for a minute and I want to go back to the colors. That was a significant passage in that the author wants you to know that Maniac didn't see the ultimate of contrasts-black and white. He couldn't figure out why blacks called themselves black. He looked at skin tones and he said, "I see cinnamon." What do you think about when you think about cinnamon?" (Transcript, . The class discussed Spinelli's use of descriptive words for colors and how some of those words (e.g., cinnamon, acorn, etc.) made them feel. Then the teacher said, "I want you to put your hands out right here" (Transcript, .
She told the children that she wanted to look at all the different shades of their hands.
The children and the teacher moved off of their chairs into the center of the circle and began to hold out their hands. Because the class was ethnically diverse with African American, Hispanic, Caucasian, and Asian children, there was a stunning array of different colored hands in the center of the circle. One child, Bill, said, "Oh cool, it goes from light to dark." Then the class discussed the colors of their own hands. They talked about butterscotch, cinnamon, flan, etc. Mrs. Weber talked about the beauty of variations and closed this discussion segment by suggesting, "I have the feeling that the author wants you to know that Maniac spends time looking at the person rather than at the skin tone" (Transcript, . (Brock, 1997, p. 129) Because Brock had videotaped the session and later conducted a viewing session with Deng, we have a window into how he interpreted the above activity. Because Deng had been in the United States for only 2 years, Brock enlisted the help of Vue, a Hmong translator, to increase the likelihood that her questions and inquiries were understood and to ensure that she understood Deng's responses. As both Brock and the translator interacted with Deng in discussing the episode above, it became clear to them that Deng had not fully understood the teacher's purpose for the activity. He interpreted the teacher's request to look at the shades of hands in the circle as a literal task, to simply observe the colors of the students' hands. It also became clear that Deng did not fully understand the concept of racism. In contrast, Mrs. Weber, Vue, and Brock understood the figurative nature of Mrs. Weber's request. In addition, Brock noted that Vue, who had lived for 8 years in the United States, understood the nature of racism in the United States because he had experienced it in school (Brock, 1999, personal communication) .
Before the scene described above, the class had engaged in both small and large group activities and discussions pertaining to racism over a period of weeks, which, according to cognitive perspectives of schema, should have assisted Deng in constructing or activating a schema for racism. Yet, as the interaction with Brock as researcher and Vue as translator made clear, Deng did not have a well-developed schema for racism. In fact, even after discussing the issue in Hmong with Vue, there was some doubt as to whether he fully understood the teacher's reasoning behind the hand activity at all. This is a case where it is possible to conclude that, because the teacher had included many activities and strategies for engaging with the concept of racism before the hand activity (opportunities for activating or constructing a schema), there was something "wrong with" or faulty in Deng's schema-a view predicated on a deficit model wherein the difficulty in learning is seen as an internal deficit of the student or his culture (Sleeter & Grant, 1988) .
On the other hand, there are those who will legitimately point out that if the teacher had more knowledge of race relations in the Asian countries where Deng had lived, she might have been able to make more direct connections to his prior knowledge. However, we feel that this second alternative fails to adequately address the context and its participants. Such a perspective assumes that "in-the-head" knowledge that could be conveyed from teacher to student will address a problem that originates in a social milieu. Given the transactional nature of knowledge, Mrs. Weber's schema of race and racism both shapes and is shaped by her engagement with the world and by the social and cultural patterns that she perceives. Even if Mrs. Weber had read about or was knowledgeable about racism in Asia, she would have understood both the constructs of race and racism from an embodied perspective-as a Euro-American female in the context of U.S. society and cultural interactions. Although knowledge of Deng's experiences in other cultures could have been helpful, such knowledge is limited by the context, the participants, and the cultural and material activity encountered. That is to say, both Deng and his teacher's under-standings are "distributed across other people and various symbols, tools, objects and technologies" (Gee, 2000, p. 198) rather than being simply contained in the mind. The example also draws our attention to the limitations of an approach to literacy instruction that posits that information about a student's culture or ethnicity is "the answer" to assisting that student in forming knowledge structures such as schema.
Deng's situation serves to illustrate the complexity of supporting comprehension for students, particularly those who are English language learners. In essence, Mrs. Weber was doing many of the "right things." She drew from a variety of texts and discussed them, albeit in teacher-directed fashion, with her students; and in the example cited here she called students' attention to their own skin colors. Yet, at the same time, Deng's teacher enacted a set of activities that replicated her own ideological relationship with the experiences and ideas represented in Maniac Magee. She presumed that in engaging in these activities, the students would reposition themselves with respect to the texts in ways that allowed their understandings to mirror her own-and these interactions were likely helpful to some children. The point here is that they were not sufficient for Deng. In this context, Deng lacked opportunities both for comprehensible input and opportunities for output. Brock notes that only in listening to Deng's own account and assisted by Vue as translator did she become aware that Deng was not understanding the story; he did not understand Mrs. Weber's earlier discussion of moral and ethical issues related to racism. Deng did not have an opportunity to construct knowledge about the text in other ways (e.g., small, dialogic, peer-led discussions) that might have provided alternative opportunities and tools for learning.
The difficulty for both Deng and his teacher lies in how to help Deng construct novel events and construct a new schema. "Many schema theorists," writes Bransford (1983) , "have very little to say about the processes by which novel events are comprehended and new schemas are acquired" (p. 263). One of the problems, Bransford argues, is that relatively subtle differences in people's schemas can have dramatic differences on their interpretations. More important, Bransford notes that much of the research on schema theory uses pre-existing schemas to demonstrate schema change or adaptation rather than addressing the issue of schema construction in relation to a totally new topic.
Bransford uses the example of an airport schema and how to understand the relationship between the following two sentences: "Jane did not wear her silver jewelry because she was going somewhere. She was going to the airport." To fully comprehend the sentences, a reader must possess a complex understanding of airports and of airport security and how it works. In a classroom for students who may not possess such a schema, we might simply tell them that there are metal detectors or even show them pictures. However, Bransford asserts, this is highly problematic because in constructing a new schema, children often have difficulty in relating pieces of information to each other. He goes on to explain by using examples of children dealing with new information regarding Native American Indians. Because the content was unfamiliar to the children, they had a great deal of difficulty understanding their texts. Furthermore, and more important here, the children did not understand how to connect the various bits of information that were in the text. According to Bransford, a monumental problem to be overcome is how to assist learners in connecting packets of information-information that they perceive to be unconnected. We have argued that activating prior knowledge, making personal connections, and the like were not enough to scaffold Deng's learning. However, given his lack of understanding after all the activities that occurred in his classroom, it would not be far-fetched for us or for Deng's teacher to conclude that the problem is Deng's lack of an appropriate schema and to place the responsibility for misunderstanding on Deng.
We are fully aware that proponents of schema theory never intended or used schema theory to promote deficit models of education. Indeed, Bransford (1983) argues against deficit models when he writes, "Some children may appear to have poor comprehension and memory skills not because they have some inherent memory 'deficits,' but because they lack or fail to activate, the background knowledge that was presupposed by a message or text" (p. 260). We wish to be equally clear that our point here is not to discount the role of the teacher, for teachers are clearly important in assisting students in their learning, particularly in guiding learners to become aware of patterns (Gee, 2000) . What we are prepared to argue is that, although connections to prior knowledge are critical, schema theory must also include specific attention to the role of cultural material and activity, and that teachers must attend to both.
Such a reformulation repositions schema as more than prior knowledge or topic knowledge. For example, although Mrs. Weber, Deng's teacher, was an experienced teacher who provided activities to support her students' learning in the unit on racism, closer analysis of Deng's classroom interactions reveal that he had little opportunity for dialogic engagement. Brock explains how, although the class engaged in group discussion of the text, these discussions almost always occurred in a whole-class setting and followed the typical IRE pattern, in which the teacher initiates a question, the children reply, and then the teacher evaluates their responses (Brock, 2005) . Further analysis revealed that only a limited number of students participated in these "discussions." These interactions differed greatly from the dialogic type of engagement that occurred between Brock, Vue, and Deng as Deng viewed the class sessions on videotape. During the viewing sessions, it is clear that Deng's growing understanding of the classroom events was mediated by both the ideal and the material artifacts present-for example, by the presence of the videotapes, by Deng's control of the remote in stopping the tape, by his use of the opportunity to ask questions of Brock and Vue, and by the language use and opportunities afforded by the presence of Brock and Vue, the Hmong translator.
In relation to Deng, we agree with Brock that Deng lacked opportunities to learn within the classroom setting. The lack of opportunities to learn were related to teacher-directed activities and strategies used in the classroom and to the lack of opportunity for Deng to publicize the knowledge that he was internalizing, or failing to internalize. The lack of opportunity in the classroom was also related to the patterns of language and of cultural activity through which Deng's learning was mediated. These patterns were not contained in Deng's mind in script-like form but existed in the patterns that Deng saw in cultural activities and materials (Holland & Cole, 1995) . Although schema theoretic perspectives draw our attention to Deng's prior experience or background knowledge and toward the teacher's efforts to support student learning by providing numerous activities or encounters with various texts involving racism, our perspective and understanding of Deng's experience is made far richer and more complex by closer consideration of sociocultural concerns, particularly the role of material and ideal artifacts. In addition, a sociocultural perspective draws our attention to how Deng was positioned by others and the political implications of such positioning. By giving Deng access to tools that would help him to articulate his understanding of class interactions (Vue as translator, a video, etc.), Brock positioned Deng as an active participant in constructing knowledge about his own learning. This shift changes the context and provides an opportunity for him to appropriate, transform, and make his knowledge public. This is, essentially, a political act, as it shifts Deng from a passive receptor of knowledge to an active participant in knowledge construction.
In summary, there are three ways that sociocultural perspectives help us to rethink Deng's classroom experiences or opportunities in ways that traditional schema theory, as conceived of by cognitive scientists, cannot. First, sociocultural perspectives draw our attention to the issues of the origin and development of Deng's schemas. This genetic question is essential in social conceptions of mind (Wertsch, 1991) and is an area of fundamental difference between social and individual perspectives of mind. This leads us to be mindful that Mrs. Weber and Deng are both filtering the construction of knowledge through cultural lenses and identities in both the private and public domain.
Second, in considering the origination and development of schemas, sociocultural perspectives draw our attention to the ways in which knower and known are not separate entities as premised in information processing models of mind. That is, in Deng's example, it is not simply the case that Mrs. Weber must assist in the transfer of knowledge "out there" in the world and in the text to Deng's mind. Rather, Deng as learner and knowledge of the text as known are mutually constitutive; knowing is a cultural process embodied within the cultural and social systems. Only a transactional view of schemas enables us to both acknowledge and explore the interdependence between the text, practices, and contexts within which the cognitive process occurs.
Third, a sociocultural perspective highlights the role of mediational tools, for example, activities such as language (both Hmong and English), and texts such as books, along with videotapes and conversations. These activities and tools involve both the material and the ideal artifacts with which Deng interacts. There is an interdependence of thought and language, and of speech and activity, in the immediate contexts within which any act of text comprehension occurs. Because thought, language, speech, and activity are interrelated and symbiotic, we are encouraged to view cognition as a cultural process rather than as only a collection of mental processes (Rogoff, 1993) . Cultural processes of cognition occur in contexts that are historically and socially bound, and thus they are political entities. From this vantage point, the role of the teacher takes on even more profound dimensions and responsibilities because the teacher is more than just a more knowledgeable other. She becomes a mediating agent who facilitates, or who may fail to facilitate, the acquisition of knowledge and the use of particular cognitive tools within a culturally bound activity system, thus emphasizing teaching itself as a political act.
Implications for Future Inquiry
Throughout this article we have tried to articulate what it means to consider schemas from a sociocultural perspective. In summary, we remind our readers of three key points: (1) Schema and other cognitive processes or structures are embodied-that is, who we are as biological beings determines our sensorial interactions with the world and thus the nature of the representations we construct; (2) knowl-edge is situated in the transaction between world and individual; and (3) these transactions are mediated by culturally and socially enacted practices carried out through material and ideal artifacts.
The implications for future inquiry turn critically on what we take schemas to be, how they are formed, and the processes by which they develop and are transformed. We have seen that many researchers consider the schema construct to be ill-defined. Yet the construct has been remarkably generative of research and educational practices. We have also seen that the conception of the schema as offered by Bartlett was based on the assumption that we build our (schematic) understandings of the world on the basis of our embodied and socially mediated transactions with the world. These transactions with others are critical in the formation and continued development of mind. Our individual schematic understandings thus emerge from, but are not reducible to, our sociocultural transactions with others. In contrast, conceptions of schema theory proffered by cognitive science have assumed that there is a divide between the knower and the known, that schemas are formed within individuals, and that schema formation is a disembodied, in-the-head proposition.
What seems clear is that individuals engage in patterned ways of interacting with, understanding, and remembering their world. Whether one conceptualizes these transformations in individual thinking in terms of schemas, cognitive structures, or representations, the fact remains that schemas (or cognitive structures or representations) are transformed as a result of these transactions with the world through material and ideational means. What seems equally clear is that we have little understanding of how the schemas originate and develop or what role social and cultural factors play in these genetic processes. As noted above, sociocultural theory has the potential to elaborate and further enrich these fundamental insights concerning the genesis and development of schemas. Perhaps the most important conceptual question raised by this treatise concerns when a construct, or theory built around a construct, ceases to be the theory (or construct) that it was. Does an embodied, transactional, and culturally informed conception of the origins and development of schemas so radically alter the received understanding of the construct that it no longer resembles what was originally intended by cognitive scientists?
We raise this last question as more than a rhetorical exercise. To acknowledge the embodied, transactional, and cultural nature of schemas also requires acknowledging and addressing the inherently political nature of knowledge-something that we have alluded to but not fully explored. While traditional versions of the schema construct that were developed by cognitive science present knowledge construction through a value-neutral metaphor (e.g., schemas are knowledge organization structures like a file cabinet) other versions (e.g., Bruner, 1996; Ferdman, 1990; Gee, 2004; New London Group, 1996) suggest that knowledge construction, particularly in the form of literacy teaching, learning, and research, is political in nature; that is, it is imbued with beliefs, ideals, and values. New Literacies scholars point to the need to acknowledge and address the increasingly diverse cultural contexts and increasingly diverse digital contexts encountered by students (Gee, 2003 (Gee, , 2004 Lankshear & Knobel, 2003) . Gee, for example, observes that those who will have access to power and social goods under new capitalism will be the "shape shifting portfolio people" (p. 105) who can rapidly adapt and use their knowledge acquired through the right "sorts of experiences, skills, and achievements . . . accrued . . . with the 'right' sort of people" (p. 106). In other words, those who have a broad repertoire of ideal and material tools and a great command of that repertoire will be able to use this knowledge to their advantage. Gee and others have noted that the increasingly multimodal nature of literacies makes it difficult to ignore the embodied nature of learning. At the same time that ever more complex types of tools are required, many minority children and many children who live in poverty, start school already at a disadvantage because many have not had the same exposure to academic discourse as their more affluent peers. Although all children come to school with pre-existing knowledge structures, in many cases the knowledge and learning processes that the children possess is not the same as, and may even conflict with, the types of knowledge and knowledge construction emphasized in school (Heath, 1983) . Many scholars advocate making use of children's internal knowledge, promoting different types of knowledge as a strength rather than a deficit (Gutiérrez et al., 1997; Heath, 1983; Moll, 1994) . In contrast to more complex and contextualized approaches to address issues of literacy and equity, neoliberal philosophies of schooling address equity through standards, testing, accountability, and a free market. Thus children who are already at a disadvantage are offered "the basics" and only the basics, when, in reality, they need much more to acquire the material and ideal tools to enable them to succeed in a rapidly changing environment.
As noted earlier, Gaffney and Anderson (2000) have observed that, in literacy research, schema theory has fallen by the wayside and is seldom used directly in explaining, exploring, or conceptualizing contemporary research. Whether the construct of schema can itself be redefined to factor in the political nature of embodied, transactional knowledge remains to be seen. When reading the critique of neoliberal agendas by New Literacies scholars, we are less than sanguine about this prospect, especially when we note that some time ago scholars encouraged researchers to widen their investigations of culture and cognition (e.g., Cole, 1996) .
On the other hand, there are a number of literacy scholars who have called attention to new and emerging digital technologies, in particular, nonlinear texts. Many literacy scholars argue that such texts require new skills and strategies for reading (Reinking, McKenna, Labbo, & Kieffer, 1998) . If so, traditional understandings of comprehension predicated on schema theory and the exploration of linear, printbased texts will likely be inadequate to explain the cognitive processes that a reader must engage when exploring texts in hypermedia environments such as the Internet. Some scholars have, in fact, noted that schemas, as rigid knowledge structures, are inadequate to explain the processes and outcomes prefigured by new technologies such as hyptertexts (e.g., Mishra, Spiro, & Feltovich, 1996; Spiro & Jehng, 1990; Spiro, Coulson, Feltovich, & Anderson, 1988) . It may well be that the work of Spiro and his colleagues in cognitive flexibility theory is more applicable to new and emerging technologies than versions of schema theory as developed by cognitive scientists. Cognitive flexibility theory, with its exploration of learning in "ill-structured domains," may also be more compatible with the perspectives advocated by New Literacies scholars.
Throughout this essay, we have engaged in what Florio-Ruane (2002) calls "epistemological stocktaking," wherein we evaluate research and theories that we ascribe to and the practices that we carry out in our field of study (p. 207) . It is in this tradition that we present this revisitation of schema. We propose our exploration of schemas as the beginning of a dialogue, in the hope that literacy researchers and edu-cators will further explore the valuable contribution that schema theoretic perspectives have made to literacy research, practice, and theory. At the same time, we acknowledge limitations of the schema construct as traditionally conceived. We propose, in addition, that literacy researchers and educators engage in productive dialogue exploring how a transactional notion of schema might assist us, as teachers and researchers, as we continue to investigate language processes such as reading, writing, listening, and speaking in the increasingly diverse social and cultural settings of U.S. society.
Notes
The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and Diane Barone, Fenice Boyd, Cynthia Brock, and Mary Rozendal for their feedback on numerous versions of this manuscript.
1
In keeping with the recommendations of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (5th ed.), we use the plural term "schemas" instead of the traditional term "schemata" throughout this article.
2
Readers interested in the notion of transaction and cultural theories of reading may wish to consult Smagorinsky (2001) . Smagorinsky does not revisit schema theoretic perspectives in his article, but his exploration of text generation and the role of tools and signs in the construction of meaning through what he calls the "transactional zone" (p. 140) is highly relevant to issues that we discuss in this article.
3
For readers interested in the origins of sociocultural perspectives and activity theory, including interesting sociohistorical contexts, we suggest Blanck (1990) ; Robbins (2003) ; Rosa & Montero (1990) ; and Van der Veer & Valsiner (1991) . 4 Several published researchers have also written about this tension. Beals (1998) notes that, on first being introduced to a definition of schema while taking a graduate course, she found it relevant in explaining her own learning. However, as she continued reading about schema theory, she quickly became "disenchanted with its application to information processing theories and methods of teaching reading." Yet she also notes that schema is "a crucial idea in the study of development" (p. 11). Beals calls upon Bakhtin's work to draw "society into the individual mind, and the individual mind into society" (p. 11) and advocates a conception of schema that is closer to Bartlett's original version than to the later version articulated by cognitive scientists.
Another example comes from William Frawley, who describes, in Vygotsky and Cognitive Science (1997) , how as a graduate student he studied both sociocultural and information-processing theories of language. In reflecting on that experience he notes: "The two views of the human-as device and a person-never seemed at odds to me. Thanks to the integrity of my teachers, they were never put at odds. That was reserved for the partisan and often dangerous world of the profession, where suggestions that the computational and the socio-cultural mind not only went together but belonged together met with a few worried looks" (p. 1).
